Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Baker and Wurgler (2002, henceforth BW) the market timing theory of capital structure has received a lot of attention. According to this theory the current capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market, by issuing equity when stock prices are high. This theory is inconsistent with two alternative theories of capital structure: the trade-off and pecking order theory, respectively.
According to the trade-off theory, firms issue equity or debt in proportions that move their capital structure toward an optimum determined by a trade off between costs (financial distress and agency costs) and benefits (tax shields and smaller free cash flow problem) of debt. When a firm's stock price rises, its leverage ratio (in market value terms) would automatically decrease, and this should lead to relatively more debt issuance to return towards the target capital structure.
The pecking order theory assumes that managers are better informed than investors, and that this asymmetric information generates adverse selection (Myers and Majluf, 1984) .
As a result, firms will finance investment in the following pecking order: first from retained earnings (internal equity), then debt, and lastly external equity.
The m arket timing theory can be reconciled with the pecking order theory, by assuming that adverse selection costs are time-varying, as are stock prices. For example, Korajczyk et al. (1992) and Choe et al. (1989) emphasize that, if firms can decide when to issue equity, they will do so in periods when asymmetric information is expected to be relatively unimportant. A problem with this approach is that there is no a priori reason why asymmetric information should be lower when stock prices are higher. To solve this problem, Dittmar and Thakor (2007) argue that the likelihood of disagreement between shareholders and management concerning project choice is lower when stock prices are high, and that managers issue equity when they believe that investors' views about project payoffs are likely to be aligned with theirs, thus maximizing the likelihood of agreement with investors.
Otherwise, they use debt.
Not only theoretically, but also empirically, BW's market timing explanation of capital structure turned out to be notable. BW, using historical, external finance-weighted average market-to-book ratios (EFWAMB) as a measure of market timing, find evidence for the US that the influence of EFWAMB on leverage is significantly negative and persistent. Especially their claim of persistency initiated a growing number of studies testing the consequences of equity market timing on capital structure. Hovakimian (2006) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) , while confirming the negative effect of EFWAMB on leverage, do not corroborate its longterm persistency. Alti (2006) and Leary and Roberts (2005) show that firms actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal range, so that effects of market timing and other shocks are temporary. Welch (2004) , on the other hand, demonstrates that firms do not use their issuing activities to counteract the mechanistic influences of stock valuation on debt/equity ratios when equity is measured in market value terms.
Two features in this growing market timing literature stand out. First, all the above mentioned studies concern US firms. The evidence on market timing for countries outside the US is typically scarce. The available evidence for a few small European economies suggests that market timing effects on leverage are less strong than in the US. 1 Second, it is perhaps no coincidence that the attention for market timing came up soon after one of the biggest boombust cycles on the international stock exchanges during the last century: the 'internet boom' in the second half of the 1990s. This boom was particularly evident in the valuation of stocks for new technology firms, active in the information and communication technology ( ICT) industries ( Figure 1 ). Visual inspection of Figure 2 suggests that the stock market boom had an especially strong impact on key financial ratios in the ICT sector, and that ICT firms issued a lot of equity during this boom, leading to a fall in leverage.
[ Figure 1 about here]
[ Figure 2 about here] Therefore, it may be interesting to investigate whether market timing effects on capital structure were stronger or even specific for ICT firms or the ICT boom episode. This induces us to contribute to the market timing literature in the following way. First and foremost we present comparative evidence for market timing effects on capital structure on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly the US, UK and continental Europe. Additionally, we zoom in on the market timing effects on ICT firms' capital structures. Lastly, w e search for time-varying market timing effects in years of rising and falling stock prices.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the market timing literature and positions the present analysis in it. Section 3 introduces our data and empirical methodology and section 4 subsequently presents the empirical connection between market timing and capital structure on both sides of the Atlantic. Section 5 concludes.
1 De Bie and De Haan (2007) give evidence for the Netherlands, Hegge (2006) also for Belgium, and Högfeldt and Oborenko (2005) for Sweden.
EFWAMB and capital structure
BW provide evidence that equity market timing has a persistent effect on the capital structure of US firms. They find that leverage is strongly and negatively related to their market timing measure and conclude that the capital structure of a firm is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. Their measure for market timing, the so-called externalfinance-weighted average market-to-book ratio (EFWAMB), is defined as follows: 
where e and d denote equity and debt issues, respectively, MB is the market-to-book ratio, and suffix s and r denote time. For a firm observed at time t, EFWAMB is the weighted average of a time-series of historical market-to-book ratios, starting with year 1, i.e. the first observation available in the sample, and ending with the market-to-book ratio at t-1. The weight for each year is the ratio of external financing in that year to the total external financing raised by the firm in years 1 through t-1. Thus, firms that issue a lot of equity when market-to-book ratios are relatively high will tend to have high values of EFWAMB. However, we note that the same holds for firms that issue a lot of debt when market valuation is high. E quity issues are defined as the change in the book value of share capital including the share premium reserve; debt issues as the change in the book value of debt; negative weights (()/()) ssrr eded ++ ∑ are reset to zero.
BW regress leverage on EFWAMB plus the usual Rajan and Zingales (1995) set of control variables including unweighted market-to-book, tangibility, profitability and firm size. 2 The unweighted market-to-book ratio controls for 'the cross-sectional variation in the level of market-to-book. What is left for EFWAMB is the residual influence of past, withinfirm variation in market-to-book' (BW, p. 15; italics in the original). The usual assumptions for the control variables are that larger and more tangible firms are safer debtors and therefore can get more debt, and that the effect of high profitability on leverage is either negative according to the pecking order theory (more funding from retained earnings) or positive according to the trade-off theory (higher tax shield from debt, lower probability of bankruptcy, bigger free cash flow problem).
BW's hypothesis is that if firms systematically time their equity issues to the market EFWAMB should have a significantly negative effect on leverage. If firms do not systematically issue equity when the level of market valuation is high, EFWAMB would be insignificant. BW test the market timing hypothesis for US firms and indeed find evidence of a significantly negative effect of EFWAMB on leverage.
At this point we want to emphasize that BW's EFWAMB measure of market timing weighs the sum of debt and equity issues by the market-to-book ratio. In the remainder of this section we shall argue that this feature of EFWAMB precludes the definition of strong empirical priors concerning its role in capital structure regressions. In particular, we shall argue that market timing does not necessarily generate a negative effect on leverage, nor that a significantly negative coefficient for EFWAMB in the leverage regression implies equity market timing.
First, let us assume that a firm substitutes debt for equity issues and vice versa, depending on the relative costs of equity and debt, while keeping the sum of external finance (equity and debt issues) constant. In that case, a low value for EFWAMB would falsely indicate that the firm is not timing the market. In other words, EFWAMB is a 'noisy' measure of equity market timing. In this particular case there is also no a priori reason for a statistically significant relationship between EFWAMB and leverage. Probably, there would be none.
BW's expectation of a negative relationship is based on the assumption that firms issue equity when stock market valuation is high, not on the assumption that firms substitute debt for equity issues when stock market valuation is relatively low.
Second, take a firm with a strong pecking order so that it may issue debt instead of equity if retained earnings are insufficient to finance good investment projects. Further, accept the rule that a firm's market-to-book ratio is higher when it has good investment opportunities (Myers, 1977) . Thus, EFWAMB for a firm may be higher because it issues debt (rather than equity) when stock prices are high. In this setting, a high value for EFWAMB would falsely indicate equity market timing. Moreover, in this case one may expect a positive, rather than a negative relationship between EFWAMB and leverage.
Third, the effect of EFWAMB on leverage could change in magnitude or even switch sign over time. Huang and Ritter (2004) , for example, argue that the pecking order may vary over time and across firms, depending on the relative cost of each type of funding. If the equity risk premium is sufficiently low, firms may even prefer external over internal equity, giving rise to the market timing feature that firms issue equity even when they do not have financing deficits (Frank and Goyal, 2003; Fama and French, 2005) . External equity can be costly because of conflicts of interest between management and outside shareholders resulting from the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . If these agency costs are sufficiently high, firms will typically prefer debt over equity in the pecking order. If they are not, managers may prefer external equity over debt when the cost of external equity falls sufficiently (i.e., when stock valuations are sufficiently high). Högfeldt and Oborenko (2005) apply this idea to explain why Swedish firms' capital structures are not as susceptible to equity market timing as are those of US firms. In Sweden, as in many other continental European countries, stock ownership is not as dispersed as in the US but is instead relatively concentrated, see Table 1 . Additionally, cash flow and control rights are more often separated due to the use of dual-class shares while they are mostly of the one-share-one-vote variety in the US. These two agency cost-increasing factors may cause a relatively large wedge between the costs of internal and external equity in continental European countries. As a result, booms on the stock market are less likely to reduce external equity cost to levels below that of debt or internal equity for European firms than for their US counterparts, who may face lower costs of external equity to start with. Indeed, Högfeldt and Oborenko (2005) find that leverage in Sweden is more sensitive to profitability due to the typical pecking order hypothesis than to historical market-to-book ratios (EFWAMB) as under the market timing hypothesis. Hegge (2006) finds evidence for Högfeldt and Oborenko's 'enhanced' pecking order hypothesis for the Netherlands and Belgium.
Data and methodology

Data
We use a dataset that contains not only US firms, but also UK and continental European firms. Keeping constant the source of the data, definition of the variables, specification of the capital structure equation and econometric techniques, we can thus assess the stability of the market timing effect in the determination of capital structure across countries and financial systems.
In addition, we distinguish ICT and non-ICT firms so that we may test whether the market timing effects on capital structure were stronger or even specific to ICT firms. Our data derives from the COMPUSTAT Global data files on publicly traded firms.
Our unbalanced panel data set contains 44,682 observations, 48% pertaining to US firms, 15%
to UK firms, and 37% to continental (western) European firms.
4
Methodology
Since our main interest is in differences in capital structure determination on both sides of the Atlantic we run capital structure regressions on our separate samples of US, UK and continental European firms. Secondly, to assess differences in market timing effects on the capital structure of ICT and non-ICT firms we interact EFWAMB with an ICT-dummy variable. Thirdly, we estimate capital structure equations on four-year moving windows, i.e. the first regression is for the 1993-1996 period and the last regression for the [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] period. This strategy allows us to detect changes in the determination of capital structure that may relate to the boom-bust cycle in ICT share prices, without abandoning the time-series dimension of our panel data set. The four-year window is both sufficiently long to allow for a meaningful role for the time series dimension of capital structure determination and sufficiently short to allow for potential changes over time in the determination of capital structure.
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We apply a heteroskedastic feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) panel estimator, allowing for a common autocorrelation structure in the error terms for each firm.
Heteroskedasticity may result from the fact that we may not capture all the determinants of capital structure with our parsimonious set of explanatory variables (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1991) . Autocorrelated error terms reflect the empirical observation that firms may exhibit extended excursions away from target capital structures. European firms. Consistent with the relative importance of outside equity financing, US leverage ratios are also lowest of all three regions. Second, relative to non-ICT firms, debt issues are about equally important for ICT firms across all regions. At the same time ICT firms raise about two to three times the amount of external finance on average as non-ICT firms do. Cumulative indebtedness is nevertheless lower for ICT firms, the difference relative to non-ICT firms being largest in the US sample.
Results
Descriptive statistics
[ Table 2 about here] Table 3 describes the market timing behavior of our sample of firms in terms of the level of external finance weighted market-to-book ratio (EFWAMB). Therefore, we f irst reconstruct the external finance weighted market-to-book ratio (EFWAMB) slightly differently from BW: 
The first difference with BW's definition is that we scale the market-to-book ratio by its firmaverage level. 6 This way, regardless of the average level of the market-to-book ratio for a firm, EFWAMB will be 1 if market conditions play no role in the firm's decision to raise external funds. Firms raising external funds specifically in years of above-average market-tobook ratios are characterized by values of EFWAMB exceeding 1. The value of BW's EFWAMB measure, being unscaled, not only reflects market timing behavior but also the average level of market-to-book for a firm. By scaling we allow a direct interpretation of any deviations from 1 of this market timing measure. Additionally, we take on board only longterm debt ltd, rather than total debt, because the former more accurately represents issuance decisions than the latter.
7
The median values for EFWAMB as reported in panel A of table 3 demons trate that EFWAMB is typically highest in the US sample and lowest in the continental European sample. The exception is the high value for EFWAMB for UK ICT firms, though the difference with US ICT firms is statistically insignificant. Also note that EFWAMB is never larger for ICT firms than for non-ICT firms in statistical terms. Quite the contrary, in the US as well as the continental European samples, median EFWAMB is significantly higher for non-ICT firms, suggesting that these firms timed the markets most actively. Hence, judging by the relative values of EFWAMB for the median firm, continental European firms are less active market timers than US firms.
[ Table 3 about here]
To see whether EFWAMB values are driven by equity or by debt issues, panels B and C of the table present results for external equity weighted average market-to-book (EEWAMB) and debt weighted average market-to-book ratios (DWAMB), respectively:
6 We thank Clemens Kool for suggesting this adjustment. 7 Leverage may also change as a result of short term debt accumulation. We shall in fact focus on debt issues as changes in the book value of long term debt titles only, as short term debt dynamics are strongly driven by intercompany (trade) credits, and as such are in large measure induced by normal business operations, and therefore to a large extent are unrelated to market timing or long term capital structure objectives (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Danbolt, 2002, 2004) . 
All our above observations on EFWAMB extend to EEWAMB, but not to DEWAMB. In other words, EFWAMB appears to be driven by EEWAMB. Median values for neither EEWAMB nor DWAMB differ much from unity for continental European firms, suggesting that market timing is not the major motivation for these firms to issue either equity or debt. This is in sharp contrast to both the US and the UK samples, where median values for EEWAMB are significantly greater than 1. Following the reasoning of Högfeldt and Oborenko (2005) , this lack of equity market timing in continental Europe may result from the high agency cost premium on external equity that reflects the strong separation of cash flow and control rights and the high concentration of control rights in that region. 8 Furthermore, note that US IC T firms' EEWAMB exceeds unity, whereas DWAMB falls short of unity. This suggests that these firms issue equity when stock prices are high and debt when stock prices are low. It also underscores our earlier point that as a result EFWAMB may measure market timing efforts noisily. This observation does not extend to US non-ICT or to firms in other regions, however.
Market timing and the capital structure
To further investigate the role of market timing on corporate capital structure we run capital structure regressions including EFWAMB as a determinant, following BW and Hovakimian (2006) . We run these regressions for our US, UK, and continental European samples and apply four-year rolling regressions. The results are in table 4. Before turning to the role of EFWAMB we give a succinct description of the overall results.
[ Table 4 about here]
The empirical determinants of corporate capital structure that we use are well-known in the relevant literature (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; ShyamSunder and Myers, 1999; Baker and Wurgler, 2002) . The same applies to most of the signs of the coefficient estimates that we obtain. Specifically, we find static tradeoff elements in capital structure management in the sense that large firms tend to ha ve higher leverage ratios, while higher interest rates associate with lower indebtedness and more risky US and continental European firms (higher beta) tend to be less levered as well. In this regard, the finding that the variable intangibles relates mostly positive ly to leverage in all three samples is counter-intuitive. In addition to the static trade-off effects, we find pecking order effects in the negative coefficient for cash flow. Market-to-book is usually expected to associate negative ly with leverage, based on the underinvestment theory of Myers (1977) . This theory states that firms with high growth opportunities 9 will choose lower leverage to prevent the cost of future underinvestment associated with high leverage. Roughly speaking, leverage in the US sample seems most strongly and negatively connected to market-to-book while this is much less the case in the continental European sample. In the UK sample, the positive connection between UK leverage and market-to-book (and beta) stands out compared to our findings for the US and continental Europe, although this is a well-documented result in the empirical literature on UK firms' capital structures (e.g. Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002) .
10
Our main focus is on EFWAMB, capturing the lasting effect of market timing on capital structure. Interestingly enough, the estimated coefficient on EFWAMB is significantly negative in all time windows in the US sample, but never significantly so in either the UK or the continental European sample. Hence, while we confirm the negative relationship between EFWAMB and leverage found in other studies for the US (BW; Hovakimian, 2006) for our sample of US firms, this empirical regularity does not seem to extend to our UK and continental European samples. The negative connection between market timing and capital structure therefore stands out as a US phenomenon.
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9 Penman (1996) demonstrates that under market efficiency the market-to-book ratio is an appropriate indicator of earnings growth, while Cheng (2005) shows that market analysts are fairly efficient in predicting future earnings. This bolsters out confidence in the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for future profitability. 10 Bevan and Danbolt (2002) note that their significantly positive market-to-book coefficient is driven by trade credit which account for more than 62% of total liabilities of UK firms in their sample. These authors interpret their results as indicating that firms with strong growth potential prefer to finance themselves with interenterprise credit rather than through more formal lines. This is consistent with the predictions of Barclay and Smith (1999) who argue that high growth firms prefer debt with few restrictive covenants in order to maintain financial flexibility. 11 Unreported robustness checks reveal that this result holds if we lag all explanatory variables by one year. Note that EFWAMB itself by construction only relates to past issue behaviour (see equation (1)).
Before jumping to conclusions, let us consider a number of potential causes why our results may diverge from those reported by BW. This may also explain why we find such strikingly different results for continental Europe. To start with, our definition of EFWAMB relates the timing of share and long-term debt issues to changes in total leverage, whereas BW look at the timing of shares and total debt issues and relate this to total leverage. To the extent that the results of continental European market timing is blurred by short-term debt dynamics, it may not be picked up by our EFWAMB variable, resulting in biased coefficient estimates.
To check for this, we first synchronize our dependent variable to the definition of EFWAMB and construct leverage as the ratio of long-term debt to assets. Subsequently we check the coefficient estimates on EFWAMB, see panel A of [ Table 5 about here]
Summing up, we confirm the empirical regularity that US capital structures associate negatively with EFWAMB, consistent with the market timing theory. We find robust evidence, however, that this result does not extend to UK and continental European samples. On the contrary, the only lasting market timing effect that we detect on continental European capital structures is that of long-term debt issues on the back of high market-to-book ratios. We now turn to the economic explanation of this finding.
What was the role of the ICT boom?
Our Table 1 ), both of which generate a relatively large wedge between the costs of debt and external equity. Högfeldt and Oborenko (2005) emphasize that the ir evidence favors a stronger pecking order in Sweden than in the US to bolster up this explanation. Indeed, returning to the capital structure regression results in Table 4 , we see that this observation extends to the continental European sample. Leverage in continental Europe is more sensitive to cash flow (in terms of absolute t-values), which is in line with the typical pecking order hypothesis as opposed to historical market-to-book ratios as under the market timing hypothesis. In the remainder of this section we attempt to take the support for this reasoning one step further.
To do so, we reconcile the market timing theory with the pecking order theory by assuming that adverse selection costs are time-varying. This builds on, for example, Korajczyk et al. (1992) and Choe et al. (1989) who emphasize that, if firms can decide when to issue equity, they will do so in periods when asymmetric information is expected to be relatively unimportant. Furthermore, we follow Dittmar and Thakor (2007) and argue that the likelihood of disagreement between shareholders and management concerning project choice is lower when stock prices are high, and that managers issue equity when they believe that investors' views about project payoffs are aligned with theirs. Within this setting, we may expect the pecking order to vary with stock price valuation. For low and normal stock price valuations debt issues are preferred over external equity issues, whereas external equity may temporarily be preferred over debt if stock prices are high (e.g. Huang and Ritter, 2004) . The key idea is that this reversal of the pecking order may be less likely to occur in Europe than in the US, as in the US the cost differential between external equity and debt may be relatively low to begin with. It could be precisely for this reason that high stock prices would induce US firms to issue external equity -driving the negative relation between EFWAMB and leverage -whereas European firms would still issue debt and for that reason exhibit a non-negative or positive connection between EFWAMB and leverage. Since ICT firms have seen such tremendous swings in share prices over our sample period, we may expect to see some of this varying ordering of the pecking order in play, even in the European samples. Thus ICT firms may have had a stronger appetite for outside equity financing relative to debt for some years, specifically during the ICT stock price boom. If this is the case, the coefficient on EFWAMB in leverage regressions should be lower in those years and revert to pre-boom levels thereafter.
Let us therefore turn to the interaction results of our ICT-dummy variable with EFWAMB in Table 4 , which deals with the potentially differential impact of market timing for ICT firms. Firstly, these results demonstrate that the coefficient on this interaction term is substantially lower in the regressions windows from 1996-1999 onwards. This result holds for all samples; in the US sample the positive interaction coefficient falls and loses its statistical significance, in the UK it drops from virtually zero to significantly negative levels, and in the continental European sample it becomes more negative and gains statistical significance. These findings are consistent with the view that the pecking order may differ over time and between firms depending on the cost-differential between debt and external equity issues.
This supports our explanation of the differential connection between EFWAMB and leverage on both sides of the Atlantic as stemming from a different ordering in the pecking order resulting from different ownership and control patterns.
Conclusion
This paper conducts a transatlantic comparison of the connection between market timing and corporate capital structure using a data base of about 45,000 observations on US, UK, and continental European firms.
We confirm the empirical regularity that leverage and historical market-to-book ratios connect negatively in US samples. We document that this result does not extend to samples of UK and continental European firms. The latter result is in line with the scarce empirical evidence for a few smaller individual European countries. Porta et al. (1998) . Control rights refers to average voting share of the main shareholder in each of the 20 largest domestic firms by market capitalization (La Porta et al., 2002) , cash flow rights is similarly constructed to reflect the share of ultimate cash flows owned by its controlling shareholder. Widely held denotes the share of the 20 largest domestic firms (in terms of market capitalization) that has a controlling shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999) . Notes: Panels A through C report median values. Statistical significance of the difference in medians at the 5 or 1 percent error level is indicated by * and ** , respectively, using the continuity corrected Pearson 2 (1) χ test. Table 4 Capital structure regression results 1993-1996 1994-1997 1995-1998 1996-1999 1997-2000 1998-2001 1999 1993-1996 1994-1997 1995-1998 1996-1999 1997-2000 1998-2001 1999-2002 ICT is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respective firm is in an ICT industry and 0 otherwise. Appendix A contains the four-digit SIC codes that we classify as ICT industries and all other variable definitions. In addition to the reported variables each regression contains a yearspecific constant term. Presented results derive from cross-sectional time -series FGLS regressions, allowing for heteroskedastic panels and a common autoregressive coefficient for all panels. The Wald test checks whether all coefficients are equal to zero. * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% error level, respectively. Table 5 Robustness: historical market-to-book effects in various specifications 1993-1996 1994-1997 1995-1998 1996-1999 1997-2000 1998-2001 1999-2002 per table 4 are included, but only the coefficients on weighted market-tobook are reported. Presented results derive from cross-sectional time -series FGLS regressions, allowing for heteroskedastic panels and a common autoregressive coefficient for all panels.
* , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% error level, respectively. 
